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COMMENTS

Negotiating Justice: The Criminal Trial
Jury in a Pluralist America
ANDREW

G.

DEISS

The destinies of the two races in this country are indissolubly
linked together.
-Justice Harlan
Plessy v Ferguson

Justice precedes peace.
-Isaiah
On October 12, 1994, the Governor of California placed a phone call to
the chief prosecutor in the O.J. Simpson trial. The prosecutor was scheduled
to begin jury selection in the case early the following week, and the Governor
expressed his firm belief that a racially representative jury panel would best
serve the interests of the people of the State of California as well as the
interests of justice. The prosecutor stated that while she agreed in principle,
her job required her to take all necessary and proper steps to secure the
conviction of the defendant in every criminal case, regardless of the case's
political sensitivity. The Governor said that he did not see it that way, and
that, for his part, he was confident that any government employee deliberately
jeopardizing the peace and safety of the community as a whole for the sake of
an ethical code would not advance far. The prosecutor admitted that the
Governor had a point. The Governor was glad she saw it his way, and stated
that he was grateful that she had taken time away from her busy schedule to
chat.
While this conversation never occurred, it would not be too surprising if
it had. From almost every angle, the Simpson case had racially charged

Andrew G. Deiss received his J.D. from the Unversity of Chicago in 1995 and his B.A.
from Yale University in 1986. He is currently an Associate with the law firm of Van
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characteristics. Indeed, few are "oblivious to the interracial marriage at the
heart of this story."' The accusation that Simpson was framed by Officer
Mark Fuhrman because of racial animosity is by now well-known. Even before
the trial, it had been discussed in diverse publications ranging from "an
ultralurid tabloid, The Globe, to the most up-market mass-circulation magazine
in America, The New Yorker." 2 The racial tension surrounding the case was
such that on July 19th, district attorney Gil Garcetti felt it necessary to meet
with fifteen black leaders who were concerned that Simpson would not get a
fair trial; they urged him not to seek the death penalty.3
Even at that stage, opinion polls confirmed that the O.J. Simpson trial had
significant racial overtones. One poll showed that, while 62 percent of white
Californians thought it was "likely" that Simpson committed the murders, only
38 percent of black Californians did.4 In light of this disparity, it is striking
to note that the jury that the prosecution finally accepted was 70 percent
black, in a city where only 10 percent of the population is African-American.'
After this jury was empaneled, U.C.L.A. law professor Peter Arenella declared
that "the defense should be dancing in the streets."6
Prosecutors also had reason to feel relieved, though they probably did not
feel that way at the time. With the dust from the Rodney King riots just
beginning to settle, it is likely that the O.J. trial posed a real threat to public
safety and property. As two young black men told one reporter, "L.A. gonna
burn to the ground if O.J. convicted." 7 Empaneling an all-white jury would
have only exacerbated the effects of a conviction.
Even before Simpson's arrest, courts and legislators across the country
were developing mechanisms to ensure that juries represent a racial crosssection of their communities.! The idea is that such mechanisms will increase
public confidence in the outcomes of criminal trials, or at least minimize public
outrage and prevent race riots sparked by controversial verdicts.9
Florida and California have passed statutes requiring judges to consider the
racial composition of the communities involved when they decide to transfer
venue."0 Other jurisdictions have statutes mandating that jury lists, which are

1. Randall Sullivan, Unreasonable Doubt, Rolling Stone 130, 142 (Dec 29, 1994).
2. Id at 141.
3. Id at 143.
4. Id at 142.
5. Id at 202.
6. Kenneth B. Noble, Experts on Juries Debate Composition of Simpson Panel, NY
Times A9 (Nov 5, 1994).
7. Sullivan, Rolling Stone at 142 (cited in note 1).
8. See Nancy J. King, Racial Jurymandering: Cancer or Cure? A Contemporary
Review of Affirmative Action in Jury Selection, 68 NYU L Rev 707, 720 (1993).
9. Id at 719.
10. Id at 720. These reforms were prompted by two recent controversial cases. The
first was the attempted prosecution of the Los Angeles police officers charged with beating
Rodney King. The second was the trial of Miami police officer William Lozano for
homicide. See generally, M. Shanara Gilbert, An Ounce of Prevention: A Constitutional
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typically drawn from such sources as voter registration and driver's license
registries, be broadened to include groups that are otherwise
underrepresented." In some jurisdictions, courts actively attempt to summon
venires that represent the racial composition of the community." In Hennepin
County, Minnesota, a new proposal would require each twenty-three-member
capital grand jury to contain at least two minority members.13 While these socalled "jurymandering" 4 mechanisms are becoming more widespread and
aggressive, no jurisdiction utilizes racial quotas on trial juries, though several
commentators have argued that they should.'
This Comment examines the constitutionality of racial quotas in trial
juries, and argues that applying racial quotas to the jury is normatively and
politically desirable as well as constitutionally permissible. In making the latter
claim, this Comment is at odds with the opinions of many scholars and
professionals who have written on this issue."6
Most experts agree that the Supreme Court's stalwart insistence on "color
blind" jurisprudence makes it likely that jurymandering mechanisms will have
to pass "strict scrutiny." They contend, further, that proponents of
jurymandering programs are unlikely to convince the Court either that the
state has a compelling interest in utilizing racial quotas, or that racial quotas
are sufficiently well-tailored to achieve that aim.' 7 This Comment argues, to
the contrary, that states can demonstrate compelling interests which justify
using racial quotas when selecting criminal juries. Moreover, this Comment
contends that using racial quotas in the jurybox is the best-formulated, besttailored approach to achieve these compelling state interests.
Prescriptionfor Choice of Venue in Racially Sensitive Criminal Cases, 67 Tul L Rev 1855,
1868-82 (1993).
11. See King, 68 NYU L Rev at 723-25 (cited in note 8).
12. Id at 725.
13. Office of the Hennepin County Attorney, Task Force on Racial Composition of the
Grand Jury, Final Report 27 (1992) ("Hennepin County Final Report").
14. Jeffrey Rosen of The New Republic magazine coined the term "jurymandering." See
King, 68 NYU L Rev at 707 (cited in note 8), citing Jeffrey Rosen, Jurymandering, New
Republic 15 (Nov 30, 1992).
15. See Albert W. Alschuler, Racial Quotas and the Jury, 44 Duke L J 704 (1995);
Sheri Lynn Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 Mich L Rev 1611 (1985);
Note, The Case for Black Juries, 79 Yale L J 531, 537 (1970).
16. See, King, 68 NYU L Rev at 707 (cited in note 8)(disapproving of racial quotas
in the jurybox, but favoring some front-end race-conscious selection processes); Andrew
Kull, Racial Justice: Trial by Cross-Section, New Republic 17 (Nov 30, 1992); Letter from
Fred L. Morrison to Louis N. Smith, in Hennepin County Final Report, appendix ("It
would appear that the proposal would have to meet the 'strict scrutiny' test. None of the
rationales put forward seems to reach this high level of necessity"); Memo from Dan
Farber to Carl Warren, in Hennepin County Final Report, appendix ("personally find[ing]
the proposal quite reasonable" but questioning whether it could satisfy Richmond v J.A.
Croson, Co., 488 US 469 (1989)). But see Letter from Sheri Lynn Johnson to Michael 0.
Freeman, in Hennepin County Final Report, appendix ("the strict scrutiny standard can be
met"); Alschuler, 44 Duke L J at 704 (cited in note 15).
17. King, 68 NYU L Rev at 745-60 (cited in note 8).
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Perhaps the most common criticism of the use of racial quotas in jury
selection" is that it will transform the jury from a "deliberative" body focused on ferreting out the facts of crime into a body in which jurors "represent" their racial constituency, a body in which jurors might "just as well mail
in their verdict."' 9 What emerges from this Comment is a view of the jury
neither as a deliberative institution wherein citizens cast off allegiance or
attachment to social or racial subgroups, nor as a representative body in which
jurors practice crass interest-group politics at the expense of the polity as a
whole. Rather, the jury is seen as a forum in which individuals drawn from interested groups negotiate a just verdict in a specific criminal case within a
range of possible just outcomes.
This understanding of the jury has much in common with the familiar
model of multiparty negotiation, in which the success of the project depends
on the attendance of all interested parties at the bargaining table. Negotiators
recognize that the failure to include significantly interested parties not only
casts doubt on the fairness of the negotiation proceedings (especially if they are
held in private), but may also throw the continued success of the negotiated
agreement into doubt."0
Conceptualizing the jury as a body that represents both particular group
interests and societal interests is not new. In fact, the structure of the institution, as it has developed historically suggests a reading that appreciates such
"negotiated" outcomes. Throughout the history of the criminal jury in England
and the United States one can find analogues to the jurymandered jury."'
Section I of this Comment outlines the Supreme Court's approach to the
issue of race-conscious state action generally, and identifies several state
interests that the Court has recognized as compelling. Section II demonstrates
how current jury selection procedures fail to achieve these compelling state
interests. Section III looks at two models of the criminal trial jury. The first
model, that of the "representative" jury, it is argued, has been the bogey-man

18. Another common criticism is that racial quotas open up the jury system to attack
from any defendant who can make a claim to membership in a minority group. On a
related note, how will the system accommodate a claim made by a defendant who is halfMexican and half-Aleutian and describes himself as gay? Must the jury contain members
of all of these subgroups?
The fact that this Comment focuses on the state's compelling interests and not the
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a cross-sectional jury turns these problems into
disputes over policy and not law. Legislators, not courts, must decide which groups are
cognizable.
For discussion of this slippery slope problem in the context of a defendant's Sixth
Amendment rights, see generally Alschuler, 44 Duke L J at 34 (cited in note 15).
19. Jeffrey Abramson, We, The Jury 11 (Basic, 1994)
20. See generally Roger Fisher and William Ury, Getting to Yes: NegotiatingAgreement
Without Giving In (Penguin, 2d ed 1991); Howard Raiffa, The Art and Science of
Negotiation (Belknap, 1982).
21. See, for example, Deborah Ramirez, The Mixed Jury and the Ancient Custom of
Trial by Jury De Medietate Linguae: A History and a Proposal For Change, 74 BU L Rev
777 (1994).
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against which much Supreme Court jurisprudence concerning the jury has
developed. The second model is theoretically similar to the model of multiparty
negotiation and has historical roots in the jury that the Constitution's Founders knew. This model, I argue, provides the theoretical justification for applying racial quotas to trial juries.
I. Compelling Interests
The Supreme Court has held that when a state acts on other than raceblind criteria, that action must be justified by a compelling state interest.
Furthermore, the Court requires that the proposed action be as narrowly
tailored as possible to achieve the demonstrated compelling end(s).' Thus, to
pass constitutional muster, jurymandering statutes must either be found not to
be race conscious,' or they must be driven by a compelling state interest. 24
Moreover; the state must also show that the plan is narrowly tailored to
accomplish the desired compelling purpose(s)Y
What, then, constitutes a compelling state interest? The Court has recognized, either directly or indirectly, four "compelling" interests that might be
used to justify jurymandering.
First, the Court has indicated that race-conscious classifications may be
justified in order to remedy past and to prevent future intentional racial
discrimination.26 Thus, a state may justify a narrowly tailored remedial program either by showing that the present jury selection process affords state
actors the opportunity to discriminate on racial grounds and that
underrepresentation has in fact occurred under the system, or by demonstrating

22. See City of Richmond v J.A. Croson Co., 488 US 469, 506-508 (1989).
23. Of course, any jurymandering effort is likely to be found race-conscious by definition. However, it is possible to argue, with John Hart Ely, that "it is not 'suspect in
a constitutional sense for a majority . . . to discriminate against itself." Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U Chi L Rev 723, 727 (1974). This
argument, though, is unlikely to persuade the Court at this stage of the game.
Professor Alschuler, on the other hand, has argued that the "Constitution requires
only that the government not stigmatize or otherwise disadvantage people, on the basis of
race.... The jury selection methods proposed in Hennepin Country do not stigmatize or
disadvantage people on the basis of race, and I believe they are constitutional." Alschuler,
44 Duke L J at 743 (cited in note 15).
24. Croson, 488 US at 498-507. One might also argue that jury service is a right or
a duty that, sui generis, is inherently different from other areas of equal protection
jurisprudence and therefore should not be subject to the standards developed to apply to
such issues as affirmative action, employment, and voting rights. It is unclear, however,
that the "jury is different" argument is conceptually distinct from the argument that the
state has a compelling interest in securing racially representative juries. Because the
compelling interest approach is well accepted, this Comment assumes the compelling
interest standard to be applicable.
For a compelling argument that the "jury is different," see Alschuler, 44 Duke L J
at 717-23 (cited in note 15).
25. Croson, 488 US at 506-08.
26. Id at 494, 509-510. See also id at 511 n1 (Stevens concurring in part).
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that the process shown has, in fact, resulted in significant racial discrimination

for a substantial period of time.27
Second, the Court has recognized that states have a compelling interest in
ensuring the integrity of their criminal justice systems.28 Proponents of
jurymandering programs have argued that racial diversity in the jurybox
encourages impartiality, thereby earning public respect for the system.29

Third, in 1940, the Court recognized that, "[i]t is part of the established
tradition in the use of juries as instruments of public justice that the jury be
a body truly representative of the community." 3 In 1975, the Court stated

that, in order to promote representative juries, the pool from which jurors are
drawn must itself represent a "cross-section" of the community.3' Some
scholars suggest that cross-sectional jury pools do not adequately protect this
Sixth Amendment right, and that the cross-sectional concept should be extend-

27. See Castenada v Partida, 430 US 482, 493-94 (1977) citing Wasbington v Davis,
426 US 229, 241 (1976). While some states may be able to make this prima facie
demonstration, it will probably be a small minority. On the other hand, it may be, as
Professor Alschuler suggested to me in conversation, that any state interested in
jurymandering will merely hire a firm to dig up evidence of past discrimination in order
to meet the Court's requirement. Conversation with Albert Alschuler, Professor, The University of Chicago Law School, in Chicago, IL (April xx, 19xx). Considering the history
of minority exclusion from the jury in this country, such evidence should be relatively easy
to find in most jurisdictions. See Albert W. Alschuler and Andrew Deiss, A Brief History
of the Criminal Jury, 61 U Chi L Rev 867, 882 (1994). Under the present standard,
therefore, jurisdictions should be able to take prophylactic measures to shield their
programs from constitutional attack, by uncovering and confessing evidence of their own
past bad behavior.
Whether or not a state can demonstrate the notorious nature of its own past, the
approach is inherently problematic. As has been well-noted, race-conscious remedies can
seem conceptually inconsistent. While the Court has recognized that the law should be
"color-blind," the race-conscious remedial approach allows state actors to discriminate in
order to remedy past impermissible racial discrimination. It is a solution that might best
be described as homeopathic.
While numerous scholars defend this "benign" approach to racial discrimination on
theoretical grounds, the concept of benign discrimination has increasingly sparked public
and legal debate. Some scholars believe that the Court will soon narrow the range of
permissible race-conscious remedies even further.
28. See, for example, Holland v Illinois, 493 US 474 (1990); Lockhart v McCree, 476
US 162, 174-75 (1986), quoting Taylor v Louisiana, 419 US 522, 530-31 (1975); Tbiel
v Southern Pacific Co, 328 US 217, 227 (1946). See also, Alschuler, 44 Duke L J at 721
(cited in note 15).
29. See Minnesota Supreme Court Task Force on Racial Bias in the Judicial System,
16 Hamline L Rev 477, 573-74 (1993). In contrast, critics can argue that race-based
selection, by definition, impermissibly uses race as a factor in the criminal trial, and thus
compromises the integrity of the criminal justice system. See King, 68 NYU L Rev at 751
(cited in note 8)(suggesting that even if the Court accepts the goal of promoting racial
diversity in the jury, the Court may still require race-conscious procedures more narrowly
tailored than quotas).
30. Smith v Texas, 311 US 128, 130 (1940).
31. Taylor v Louisiana, 419 US 522, 528 (1975) (cross sectionalism is "an essential
component of the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial").
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ed beyond the voir dire selection stage to the trial jury that is actually
enpaneled.32
There are several problems with this line of reasoning. To begin with,' the
Court has already explicitly ruled that defendants do not have a constitutional
right to a jury that is, in fact, representative of a cross-section of the community.33 If the Court were to overrule this previous holding, it would open the
floodgates to claims from defendants seeking jurors who are racially, ethnically, or otherwise "similar." The Court has stressed its concern over this danger
34
in the past.

Fourth and finally, the Court has suggested that state use of racial classifications may be justified in response to situations that pose "imminent danger
to life and limb." 3' Recent history reminds us that such danger may often
exist in the context of racially charged criminal trials, and it is with this
compelling state interest that I begin below.
II. Current Jury Selection Procedures Fail to Achieve Compelling State
Interests
In 1880, the Supreme Court handed down two cases that have significantly
shaped the jurisprudence of race relations and the jury until the present day.
In Strauder v West Virginia,31 the Court held that a state statute limiting jury
service to "white males" violated the right of African-American defendants to
equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
In Virginia v Rives,37 a companion case decided the same day, the Court
dramatically limited the significance of Strauder by concluding that de facto
segregation in the jurybox, absent explicit de jure exclusion, did not violate the
Constitution." This unfortunate holding helped usher in the "Jim Crow"
and social landscape of the South for the
structures that dominated the legal
3'
century.
a
of
next three-quarters
32. See Alschuler, 44 Duke L J at 723-728 (cited in note 15).
33. Id at 717 n61. See also Taylor, 419 US at 538 citing Fay v New York, 332 US
261, 284 (1947); Lockhart v McCree, 476 US 162, 174 (1986); Apodaca v Oregon, 406
US 404, 413 (1972).
34. See Batson v Kentucky, 476 US 79, 86 n6 (1986) ("Indeed, it would be impossible
to apply a concept of proportional representation to the petit jury in view of the
heterogeneous nature of our society.").
Therefore, this Comment will not attempt to discuss or rely on the defendant's 6th
Amendment right to a cross-sectional jury, or the State's interest in protecting that right.
35. Croson, 488 US at 521 (Scalia concurring).
36. 100 US 303 (1880).
37. 100 US 313 (1880).
38. Id at 322-23 ("It is a right to which every colored man is entitled, that, in the
selection of jurors to pass upon his life, liberty, or property, there shall be no exclusion
of his race, and no discrimination against them because of their color. But this is a
different thing from the right which it is asserted was denied to the petitioners by the
State court, viz. a right to have a jury composed in part of colored men.")(emphasis in
original).
39. See generally Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Juries, Jurisdiction, and Race Discrimination:
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Not until Taylor v Louisiana" in 1975, (made possible by the Court's
1968 decision in Duncan v Louisiana,41 making the Sixth Amendment right
to an impartial jury applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment) did the Court hold that:
[t]he presence of a fair cross section [sic] of the community on venires,
panels, or lists from which petit juries are drawn is essential to the
fulfillment of the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of an impartial jury trial
in criminal prosecutions.4"
The Court has repeatedly made clear, however, that the right of a defendant
to a jury chosen from a cross-section of the community does not mean that a
defendant has a right to trial by a jury that, in fact, mirrors the makeup of
the community.43
While the Court has made it clear that the Equal Protection Clause does
not establish a defendant's right to representative cross-sectionalism in the
jurybox, it has never held that a state may not grant such a right in order to
achieve its own interests. This fact is particularly compelling if, as will be
argued below, the jury selection standards the Court has recognized as necessary to protect the criminal defendant's rights fail to protect compelling state
interests.
A.

LIFE AND LIMB

Much, if not most, of our nation's most bloody and persistent internal strife
has been the product of racial tensions. The Civil War, however historians may
debate its etiology," had much to do with race. And although:
[a] great many Americans ... assume that.., urban racial violence began
in this country about 1964 or 1965.... In the decades since the beginning
of the Civil War few years passed without at least one race riot, but Americans have always insisted on regarding this kind of violence as extraordinary.4"
Racially motivated group violence has occurred in other forms too; from 1889
to 1941, some 3,842 lynchings were reported in this country.4 Such statistics,

The Lost Promise of Strauder v. West Virginia, 61 Tex L Rev 1401 (1983).
40. 419 US 522 (1975).
41. 391 US 145 (1965).
42. 419 US at 526.
43. Rives, 100 US at 322-23; Taylor, 419 US at 538; Lockhart v McCree, 476 US
162, 173 (1986).
44. For an overview, see Eric Foner, Slavery, The Civil War, & Reconstruction in Eric
Foner, ed, The New American History 73 (Temple, 1990).

45. Charles Crowe, Racial Massacre in Atlanta, September 22, 1906, in Paul
Finkelman, ed, 9 Race, Law, and American History, 1700-1990 118 (Garland, 1992).
46. Dominic J. Capeci, Jr., The Lynching of Cleo Wright: Federal Protection of Consti-
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of course, come from a time before video cameras and mass communication, and
are therefore probably gross underestimates.
To be sure, unlike the violence that erupted in Los Angeles and around the
country in the wake of the Rodney King trials,4 7 most of this violence was not
sparked by criminal verdicts rendered by "all-white" 4s juries. Nevertheless,
racialized criminal trials have a long and sordid history in this country. Criminal
verdicts handed down by racially segregated juries have resulted in social unrest
ranging from widespread disrespect for the integrity of the judicial system to
outright riot. It is appallingly easy to compile a lengthy list of such cases-any
one of which could have provoked an uprising comparable in size to the Los
Angeles riots of 1992-but a sampling will do:
** On March 25, 1931, a fight erupted on a freight train between two
groups of young drifters travelling across northern Alabama. One of the
groups was black, the other white. The black group succeeded in throwing
all but one of the whites off the train. When the train arrived at the next
station in Paint Rock, Alabama, nine black youths believed to be involved
were arrested to the cheers of a waiting posse. In the process, the posse
discovered two white women dressed in men's clothing. One of the women
said she'd been raped by the young men. Within two weeks time the youths
were brought to trial in Scottsboro, Alabama. The nine were tried in four
separate trials, none of which lasted longer than a day. All but one of the
"Scottsboro boys" were found guilty and sentenced to death. The remaining boy's trial was declared a mistrial because the prosecutor had asked for
life imprisonment (as the boy was only 13 years old) and several of the
jurors demanded that the child receive the death penalty. The juries were
all-white.49
In the summer of 1955 in Money, Mississippi, Emmett Till, a fourteenyear-old African-American visitor from Chicago, accepted a dare to speak
to a white woman. "Bye, Baby," he said. Several days later, Till's body was
discovered in the Tallahatchie River. Roy Bryant, the husband of the white
woman, and J.W. Milam, the woman's brother, were charged with Till's
murder. The principal evidence against them was the testimony of an
African-American, Mose Wright. Following the defendants' acquittal, they
sold their story to a journalist for $4,000. According to the journalist,
Bryant and Milam explained that they had meant merely to frighten the
child but "had" to kill him when he refused to beg for mercy. The jury
that acquitted them was all-white."0
**

tutional Rights During World War II, in Paul Finkelman, ed, 9 Race, Law, and American
History, 1700-1990 47(Garland, 1992).
47. See Note, Out of the Frying Pan or Into The Fire? Race and Choice of Venue
After Rodney King, 106 Harv L Rev 705 (1993).
48. While the jury in the criminal prosecution of the officers accused of beating
Rodney King was not technically "all-white," it had no black members. See Seth Mydans,
Prosecutor Seeks Retrial of Officer in Rodney King Case, NY Times A20 (May 14, 1992).
49. See Norris v Alabama, 294 US 587 (1935); Dan Carter, Scottsboro: A Tragedy of
the American South (LSU, 1969); James Goodman, Stories of Scottsboro (Pantheon, 1994).
50. See Juan Williams, Eyes on the Prize: America's Civil Rights Years, 1954-1965 39-
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* * In Miami, Florida, in 1980, four white police officers were charged with
beating to death a young black man who had been arrested for a traffic
offense. When an all-white jury acquitted the police officers, riot followed."1

The Court has not been blind to the fact that jury verdicts lacking the
confidence of the public can be explosive. Moreover, the Court has recognized
that states have an interest in protecting the public from such conflagrations. In
Georgia v McCollum, the Court declared:
[tihe need for public confidence [in jury verdicts] is especially high in cases
involving race-related crimes. In such cases, emotions in the affected
community will inevitably be heated and volatile. Public confidence in the
integrity of the criminal justice system is essential for preserving community
peace in trials involving race-related crimes.5 2
Moreover, in this age of telecommunications, the "affected community" may not
be limited to the jurisdiction in which the case arose or is tried. Thus, in 1992,
Americans across the country watched the fire in Los Angeles on television and
reasonably feared that it might spread.
In situations such as these, the sort of jury pool cross-sectionalism guaranteed by Taylor"3 may not adequately protect the public. Indeed, the jury selection process in the Rodney King case almost certainly complied with Taylor. 4
Even without the now infamous transfer of venue in the King case, it is possible
that the court could have empaneled an "all-white" jury in the original venue
while complying fully with the dictates of the Taylor decision. Had the acquittal
been delivered by this hypothetical all-white jury, there is reason to believe that
the ensuing riots would have been even worse.
Some may insist that the law should not be bullied by threats of racial
violence, but must remain "color-blind" at all costs. They will argue that
utilizing racial quotas in the jurybox will not achieve justice, but merely the
appearance of justice."5 Abramson, for instance, has complained that

52 (Viking, 1987); Stephen J. Whitfield, A Death in the Delta 51-57 (Johns Hopkins,
1991).
51. See William T. Pizzi, Batson v. Kentucky: Curing the Disease But Killing the
Patient, 1987 S Ct Rev 97, 153-54.
52. 505 US 42, 49 (1992).
53. 419 US at 530.
54. Id.
55. See, for example, King, 68 NYU L Rev at 763, 767-775 (cited in note 8);
Marianne Constable, The Law of the Other: The Mixed jury and Changing Conceptions
of Citizenship, Law, and Knowledge 44 (Chicago, 1994); Abramson, We, the Jury at 125

(cited in note 19).
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[the] attempt to justify the cross-sectional ideal by reference to its contribution to the appearance rather than the actuality of justice is disturbing....
The way to justice, we are told, is not through some mythic course of impartial deliberation floating free of racial, gender, ethnic, and economic
bias. Justice, alas, is reached by miring the jury in representing those subtle,
imponderable but inescapable biases and preferences we all imbibe along
with our group identities."
This argument, however, embraces a skeletal view of justice that focuses on the
jury's ability to "find" brute legal "facts," 57 but largely ignores the dense interplay between facts and law in a criminal trial. In effect, this view presupposes a
Platonic notion of "justice" that is independent from, not constituted by, social
processes. Ironically, while condemning race-consciousness in the jury selection
process, this view assumes racial difference in the deliberation process; a pure
"color-blind" jurisprudence could not permissibly assume that a just result would
be compromised by the presence or absence of certain racial groups on a jury.
To do that the law would have to assume that members of different races and
groups will deliberate differently."8
The more serious suggestion implicit in this argument is that a just outcome
is achieved only by a randomly chosen jury, and that the very process of using
race-conscious selection procedures contaminates or politicizes the jury's character in a way that will jeopardize such an outcome. However, as will be argued
below, racial quotas on petit juries will probably de-politicize deliberation more
often than they politicize it. Moreover, there are good reasons to believe a just
result can only be born of a jury that is, in fact, racially integrated.
B. THE INTEGRITY OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
In Taylor, the Supreme Court recognized the right of a criminal defendant to
trial by a jury drawn from a pool composed of a cross-section of the community. 9 The Court insisted, however, that a criminal defendant has no right to
demand that the jury actually empaneled represent the community.60 All the
defendant has a right to demand is that the jury is derived by a neutral (read
t.

56. Abramson, We, the Jury at 125 (cited in note 19).

57. There may be good reasons to believe that interracial juries actually find "facts"
better than uni-racial ones in this culture. See Douglas L. Colbert, Challenging the
Challenge: Thirteenth Amendment as a Prohibition Against the Racial Use of Peremptory
Challenges, 76 Cornell L Rev 1, 110-115 (1990).
58. This, as an empirical matter, may well be true in the aggregate. See Nancy J.
King, Postconvition Review of Jury Discrimination: Measuring the Effects of Juror Race
on Jury Decisions, 92 Mich L Rev 63 (1993). However, the law probably should not seek
to enshrine this "difference."
59. 419 US at 522, 530.
60. Id at 538; Lockhart, 476 US at 173 ("We have never interpreted the fair-crossto reflect the composition of the
section principle ... to require petit juries ...
community at large").

334

Roundtable

[3:323

"random") process from a representative pool.
As noted above, this certainly does not preclude a state from acting on its
own to ensure that trial juries (and not just jury pools) actually represent a cross
section of the community, provided it can come up with an interest the Court
would find "compelling." Indeed, the Court has flirted with such an "interest,"
declaring that representative jury participation is "critical to public confidence in
the fairness of the criminal justice system" and that the "broad representative
character of the jury ... [assures] a diffused impartiality."6 '
So, a criminal defendant's right to a "'fair cross-section of the community'
refers in large part to a method of selecting jurors that is best described as
"statistical." 62 As this Comment has examined, the statistical approach may
often fail to protect the state's interest in maintaining the integrity of the criminal
justice system as a whole. 3 Specifically, the use of a statistical approach to jury
selection does not prevent the empaneling of all-white juries in cases as racially
charged as Rodney King's." In fact, the statistical approach would guarantee
that at least some racially charged cases will be decided by all-white juries.6 In

61. Taylor, 419 US at 530, quoting Thiel v Southern Pacific Co., 328 US 217, 227
(1946) (Frankfurter dissenting).
62. Constable, The Law of the Other at 30-31 (cited in note 55).
63. This is not to discount entirely the advantages of a "statistical" approach. The
principal benefit is the elimination of dangerous human discretion, which can include both
intentional and unconscious prejudice. Some may prefer this "randomness" out of a
wariness of the possibility for abuse inherent in any system where human discretion could
open the door for prejudice to corrupt the institution.
64. In addition, the statistical approach (especially given the current structure of the
selection process in many jurisdictions) will produce juries in which minority members are
given only "token" representation. The result of such minimal representation may be, as
argued below, unnecessarily to politicize the deliberation process.
65. The very fact that a jury is all-white can have the effect of racializing a proceeding:
Few statements are more likely to evoke disturbing images of American criminal justice than this one: "The defendant was tried by an all-white jury."
Alschuler, 44 Duke L J at 704 (cited in note 15).
Moreover, the statistical approach, as executed, is far from random. First,
"[pirocedures at each phase of jury selection continue to exclude greater percentages of
minorities than whites." King, 44 NYU L Rev at 712 (cited in note 8). Second, challenges
for cause, and especially peremptory challenges, cannot help but impose a non-random
back-end procedure on a front-end random one, thus distorting the pool. While the
Supreme Court has held that peremptory challenges based solely on race or sex are impermissible, it is likely that such impermissible motivations are partial factors in many
challenges. As Alschuler has argued:
[C]ourts must determine what reasons for exclusion are disingenuous or
pretextual-a particularly difficult task when a prosecutor relies on a juror's asserted
mannerisms to justify an exclusion. A black who wishes to serve on a jury must be
careful to look directly at the prosecutor. The Fifth Circuit has upheld an exclusion
grounded primarily on a prospective juror's failure to maintain eye contact. The prospective juror must not look too much, however. The Seventh Circuit has upheld an
exclusion that a prosecutor explained by saying, "Mr. Declinton [the prospective
juror] . . . was sitting directly to my right, only a space of approximately four feet
from me, and both yesterday and today he spent a great deal of time in examining
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essence, this system may simply pass the buck, preferring the whim of Fate or
Luck or Statistics to an engineered outcome-perhaps out of an abundance of
caution regarding the possibility for abuse inherent in a system of engineered
outcomes.
Several objections will be made to this observation. First, some will contend,
the assumption that verdicts handed down by all-white juries in racialized
criminal cases would differ appreciably from verdicts delivered by all-AfricanAmerican juries is both unsupported and, probably, legally untenable-if only
because no reliable measurement exists." These commentators will argue that
the reasoning that motivated the Court in Batson v Kentucky67 to prohibit
prosecutors from using their peremptory challenges to strike jurors solely because
of their race also invalidates the use of racial quotas in the jurybox. In Batson,
the Court held:
[T]he Equal Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor to challenge [peremptorily] potential jurors solely ...on the assumption that black jurors as a
group will be unable impartially to consider the State's case against a black
defendant."8
There are several justifications for the Court's holding in Batson that are
inapplicable to jurymandering programs. First, Batson and its twin,
McCollum, 9 apply specifically to the unique harms created by the impermissible
use of race discrimination in peremptory challenges:
Regardless of who invokes the discriminatory [peremptory] challenge, there
can be no doubt that the harm is the same-in all cases, the juror is
subjected to open and public racial discrimination.7"
This palpable, personal stigmatization simply does not occur in jurymandering
proposals that are designed to make determinations behind the scenes."
Nor can whites reasonably claim that they are stigmatized as a group, since
me in a way which I felt was in the end becoming rather hostile."
Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges
and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U Chi L Rev 153, 175-76 (1989) (citations omitted).
66. But see generally King, Postconviction Review of Jury Discrimination, 92 Mich L
Rev 63, 82 (1993).
67. 476 US 79 (1986).
68. Id at 89.
69. 505 US 42 (1992).
70. Id at 49.
71. The Hennepin County proposal is illustrative. Under the proposal, would-be grand
jurors fill-out an application asking them whether they want to be identified as a minority
juror. Of the total list, 21 of 23 total are selected at random. If, according to the
questionnaires of these 21, there are at least 2 minority members, the remaining two are
selected at random from the general pool.'If, however, there are less than two self-identified minority members, names are drawn from an exclusively minority pool. See Hennepin
County Final Report at 27 (cited in note 13).
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they are not excluded generally. Neither is the claim persuasive that whites as a
group are harmed in any other way by mandatory minority representation in the
jurybox.
Moreover, there is reason to believe that African-Americans are more likely
than whites to view jury service, like military service, as a relative good, and that
increasing the numbers of African-Americans on trial juries may turn out to be
Pareto optimal.72 As members of a minority group that has suffered the unjust
effects of a criminal justice system that systematically disadvantages them,7 3 it
is possible that African-Americans generally value the opportunity to serve on a
jury more highly than whites. Finally, as will be argued below, Euro-Americans,
as a group, will benefit from a criminal justice system that shares the support
and respect of the community at large. This Pareto-optimal exchange may end up
producing even more benefits for the community as a whole.
Some may say that this argument misses the point entirely. They may argue
that racial quotas on trial juries will perpetuate and intensify racial discrimination in the law and racial division in society at large. This belief arises, in large
part, from a mistaken tendency to view the jurymandered jury as a "representative" institution of majoritarian democracy rather than as an institution of
multiparty negotiation.
III. Two Models of the Jury
A. TILTING AT WINDMILLS: THE REPRESENTATIVE MODEL

To most critics, the danger of the jurymandered petit jury is that it will
encourage jurors to view themselves as racial "representatives" rather than as
deliberative peers." The danger that jurors will vote as "racial representatives,"
however, has been greatly exaggerated.
First, the danger posed by politicized juries is not new or limited to the
racialized cases. Second, the institutional structure of the jury mitigates the
adverse consequences of politicized deliberation. Third, it is unlikely that

72. As Jon Elster has written:
It is not always clear whether something is a good or a burden. Are voting and

jury service rights or obligations? Workers who are offered early retirement schemes
often perceive them as a mixed blessing, as do women with respect to the maternal

presumption for child custody. In both cases, the formal right easily turns into an
informal obligation. For members of the ethnic majority, military service is usually
seen as a burden, but for minority members it is sometimes perceived as a good.
Jon Elster, Local Justice: How Institutions Allocate Scarce Goods and Necessary Burdens
20 (Russell Sage, 1992).
73. Consider the words of Gunnar Myrdal in 1944:
It is notorious that practically never have white lynching mobs been brought to
court in the South, even when the killers are known to all the community and are
mentioned by name in the local press.
Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy 55253 (Harper & Row, 1944).
74. See Abramson, We, the Jury at 125 (cited in note 19).
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jurymandered jurors will be any more likely to view themselves as racial representatives than jurors chosen from a randomly drawn panel. In many cases,
jurymandered jurors may feel less compelled to deliberate "racially" than their
randomly-drawn counterparts. Finally, even if racially representative juries decrease consensus in the jurybox, disagreement should not be read as a failure of
justice, but as the cost of achieving it in a deeply pluralist culture.
1. A history of the voting juror.
The specter of the representative juror haunts most the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence on equal protection and the jury. In Batson, for example, the
Supreme Court declared:
Indeed, it would be impossible to apply a concept of proportional representation
to the petit jury in view of the heterogeneous nature of our soci75
ety.
What the Court has feared for logistical reasons, others have criticized on
other grounds. The vision of the proportionally representative jury, Abramson
has noted, is a "nakedly political" vision of "competing groups. " 76 As
Abramson points out, the use of the proportionally representative jury can lead
to a cynicism "inwhich there [is] not one justice for juries to represent but
multiple justices reducible to whom a juror happened to be by race, sex, national
origin, religion, occupation, income, educational level, and on and on."'
In this world, Abramson laments, "there is no longer anything special about the
jury... that exempts it from the normal barter and compromises of representa"7
tive democracy. 1
Indeed, some may argue that jurymandered juries will deepen the divisions
that already exist in society. Jurymandered juries may merely vote the party
ticket; they may be willing to convict or acquit defendants based on issues
entirely unrelated to the factual guilt or innocence of the defendant.79 At least

75. Batson, 476 US at 86 n6.
76. Abramson, We, The Jury at 125 (cited in note 19).
77. Id at 124.
78. Id at 125.
79. Such critics could point to a recent development in Tyler, Texas in August of
1992. On August 10th, the New York Times reported that,
[B]lack anger over several cases of perceived injustice by the police and the court
has broken the quiet [of the town]. Protests have been loudest over the fatal
shooting of an 84-year-old black woman [Annie Rae Dixon] by a white police
officer in a botched drug raid .... On July 10 a grand jury of 8 whites and 2
blacks voted not to return charges against the officers .... The Dixon case
intruded into an unrelated case five days after the grand jury decision, when three
black jurors refused to go along with nine whites in convicting a black man accused

of kidnapping, robbing and sexually assaulting a white woman.... All the jurors
in that case insisted that they weighed the charges on the merits,
admitted later that the Dixon case had come up in their deliberations
debate became heated along racial lines .... Since the trial, one of the
James Hawkins, has frequently spoken out on injustice to blacks and

but several
and that the
black jurors,
angrily con-
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one commentator believes that it is not uncommon for African-American jurors
to "refrain[] from voting to convict defendants they thought were guilty because
they didn't want to send any more young black men to prison.""0 In a regime
of jurymandered juries, critics may ask, will such reasoning become the norm,
not the aberration?
While it is easy to find examples of today's juries voting rather than deliberating in the jurybox, it is no more difficult to find examples throughout our
nation's history."' In 1765, "a Bostonian could boast that the whigs 'would
always be sure of Eleven jury men in Twelve."'8 2 Before Aaron Burr's 1807 trial
for treason, founding father and then-President Thomas Jefferson (who was both
politically and personally hostile to Burr) unsuccessfully attempted to pack the
grand jury against Burr. According to Jefferson, the grand jury that was finally
empaneled contained, "2 Fed[eralists], 4 Quids, and 10 Republicans."83
Or consider an 1828 case tried in Huntsville, Alabama, immediately following Jackson's presidential victory over Adams. During his argument before the
jury, the defense counsel made much of the fact that the defendant was a relative
of Old Hickory himself (if only a distant one). When the jury retired:
[T]hey retired, under charge of the court to the room assigned them for
conference; but no conference there took place. Their minds were already
made up. A loud "hurrah for Jackson" [sic] was heard as they left the
court room [sic], and
84 a few minutes thereafter, they returned with a verdict
for the defendant.
It is hard to develop a principled defense of such an overtly political trial.
But for every example of the "lawless" jury, there is a jury that felt a duty to
obey a "higher" than human law. Such examples can be drawn from every peri-

fronted the chief of police, Larry Robinson, at a community meeting called to
address such concerns ....
Sitting on a cracked wooden chair in his family's
ramshackle corner store this week, Mr. Hawkins said of the trial: "I think that
brother might have been guilty. We just said, 'Reasonable doubt,' just like they did
on Annie Rae."
Roberto Suro, Police Shooting Focuses Black Anger in Texas City, NY Times A10 (Aug
10, 1992).
80. Randall Kennedy, Forum: When Jurors Won't Convict Because Of Race, Sacramento Bee A19 (Nov 13, 1994).
81. The fact that earlier examples cannot be found of juries breaking down along
racial lines has much to do with the fact that the first African-Americans probably did not
sit on a jury in the United States until 1860, when two sat in Worcester, Massachusetts.
See Leon F. Litwack, North of Slavery: The Negro in the Free States, 1790-1860 94
(Chicago, 1961).
82. See John Philip Reid, In a Defiant Stance: The Conditions of Law in Massachusetts
Bay, The Irish Comparison, and the Coming of the American Revolution 29 (Penn State,
1977).
83. Paul S. Clarkson and R. Samuel Jett, Luther Martin of Maryland 247 n 7 (Johns
Hopkins, 1970).
84. Henry Foote, The Bench and Bar of the Southwest 11 (Soule, Thomas &
Wentworth, 1876).
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od of our history. Consider, for instance, the acquittal of John Peter Zenger in
1735,"5 the numerous acquittals of abolitionists "accused" of rescuing recaptured runaway slaves before the Civil War," and the acquittals of dozens of
Vietnam War protestors during the '60s and '70s. s" Many of these American
jurors would, no doubt, agree with the words John Adams penned in 1771,
asking: "[Is it not an Absurdity to suppose that the Law would oblige [jurors]
to find a Verdict according to the Direction of the Court, against their own
Opinion, Judgment, and Conscience?""8
Even with the benefit of hindsight, however, it can be difficult to distinguish
between principled nullification and lawlessness. In 1768, British officials seized
one of John Hancock's ships in a Scottish port and accused him of smuggling.
The officials took advantage of the fact that the incident occurred on the high
seas to bring an action against Hancock in admiralty court, where he could not
receive a jury trial. The court upheld the seizure and delivered both the vessel
and its contents over to customs officials in forfeiture. 9
Hancock responded by bringing a suit against the customs officials for
trespass. In the trial, which was held before a jury, the judge instructed the jury
that the decision of the admiralty court could not be "traversed." The jurors,
nonetheless, held the customs officials liable for Hancock's loss. Reflecting on
this trial,.Abramson notes that "Hancock's jurors took their place among other
jury heroes who resisted tyrannical laws.""0
The "tyrannical law" that Hancock broke" is not altogether different in
principle from the crime that sends many to prison today: drug smuggling and
sales. Will the Abramson of the year 2200 describe as heroes the jurors who,
85. The most noted colonial jury trial was the trial of John Peter Zenger, a New York
printer who was charged with seditious libel for printing a parody of the Governor. The
surviving accounts of Zenger's trial are probably partisan, but whether fair or slanted,
these accounts greatly influenced the Founders' views of the jury. See James Alexander, A
Brief Narrative of the Case and Trial of John Peter Zenger, Printer of the New York
Weekly Journal (Harvard, 1963); Stephen Botein, ed, 'Mr. Zenger's Malice and Falshood'
Six Issues of the New York Weekly Journal, 1733-34 (American Antiquarian Society,
1985).
86. In some jurisdictions, it proved impossible for prosecutors to secure convictions of
the rescuers from juries sympathetic to the anti-slavery cause. Leonard W. Levy, Judgments: Essays on American Constitutional History 312 n 48 (Quadrangle Books, 1972);
See also Thomas D. Morris, Free Men All: The Personal Liberty Laws of the North,
1780-1861 148-59 (Johns Hopkins, 1974); Robert M. Cover, Justice Accused: Antislavery
and the Judicial Process 175-225 (Yale, 1975).
87. See, for example, United States v Anderson, 356 F Supp 1311 (D NJ 1973). See
generally Abramson, We, the Jury at 57-60 (cited in note 19); Alan W. Scheflin and Jon
M. Van Dyke, Jury Nullification: The Contours of a Controversy, 43 Law and Contempo-

rary Problems 51, 199-201 (1980).
88. L. Kinvin Wroth and Hiller B. Zobel, eds, 1 Legal Papers of John Adams 230
(Belknap, 1965).
89. Reid, In a Defiant Stance at 32 (cited in note 82).
90. Abramson, We, the Jury at 24-25 (cited in note 19).
91. Id at 24 (Hancock's crime was "importing more goods than had been declared
during loading").
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because of principle, refuse to convict African-Americans because there are
already too many in prison? Maybe over time, those juries that failed to be
swayed by Operation Rescue's plea for jury nullification in cases involving abortion protest 92 will be seen as slavishly legalistic. The difference between higher
law and lawlessness may be in the eye of the beholder.
2. Structural defenses.
The fear that racial quotas will encourage jurors merely to "vote" along
racial lines fails to respect the extent to which the criminal trial jury, as it has
developed historically, contains significant and effective checks that encourage
deliberation and discourage interest group politics in the jurybox.
First, the jury is a body that deliberates only once. The ad hoc nature of the
institution has mixed effects. Critics of the jury may argue that the fact that each
jury decides only one case prevents the institution from gaining the expertise
necessary to resolve disputes intelligently; moreover, they could contend, the
jury's life-span makes consistent verdicts across trials impossible. This position
is probably not short on proponents, since criminal justice has been reduced to
brute application of the dictum "treat like cases alike."" But these critics fail to
appreciate the values secured by such ad hoc decisionmaking bodies. Juries have
the relative advantage of being less cynical than judges, less jaded, and more
attuned to the incommensurability of each case.
Whether or not experience is a desirable juridical quality, it is still suspect in
a democratic society. In democracies, the problem of agency capture can be
significant. The ad hoc nature of the jury, however, makes it impossible for any
group to capture control of the institution from the inside. 4 This means not
only that the jurors empaneled in the criminal trial of the officers accused of
beating Rodney King will decide only one case, but also that the "institution" of
the jury does not take on a bureaucratic life of its own.
The jury is also not burdened by the demands of stare decisis. When jurors
consider either "legal," "factual," or hybrid questions, they are generally not
constrained by the reasoning of earlier juries, nor are they attempting to speak
to later ones.5 The jury does not function as the Janus-headed judge must. A

92. Id at 57-59.
93. Harry H. Wellington, Interpreting the Constitution: The Supreme Court and the
Process of Adjudication 81-82 (Yale, 1990).
94. Of course, the history of the jury in the United States has been one of exclusion
of minorities and women. But the capture of the jury by white males was accomplished
not from within the institution itself but from external legal sources. Albert Alschuler and
Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal Jury in the United States, 61 U Chi L
Rev 867, 877-82 (1994).
95. Indeed, the archetypal jury is so "innocent" of the law that it has been the
perennial butt of jokes. For example, Mark Twain gleefully related a case he came across
in which:
[w]hen the peremptory challenges were all exhausted, a jury of twelve men was
impaneled-a jury who swore they had neither heard, read, talked about nor
expressed an opinion concerning a murder which the very cattle in the corrals ...
were cognizant of! . . . It actually came out afterward, that one of [the jurors]
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jury need not look forward in time to consider how a "rule of law" will serve to
resolve future legal conflicts; nor need they struggle to connect the present
decision with a complex tradition of legal principles. Rather, the jury's eye
focuses on the immediate, present, and practical. Juries don't make law, they
make decisions.
Undoubtedly, juries will occasionally give undue influence to factors, political
factors for example, that the law does not countenance. There will be those who
bristle at the notion that such factors play a role in the decisionmaking process
of the jury. A criminal defendant's guilt or innocence should be weighed, it will
be argued, on a balanced scale free of all extraneous concerns.
This argument is persuasive, but overstated. First, sensitivity to political and
social factors may not necessarily be stronger in the jurybox than in the judge's
chambers. 6 Second, the fact that judges are repeat players means that a judge's
personal political leanings pose a greater danger to democracy than a juror's.
Moreover, as the Supreme Court has recognized, "statistical studies suggest that
the risk of convicting an innocent person (Type 1 error) rises as the size of the
jury diminishes." 7 These studies suggest that the likelihood of Type 1 error is
greater in a judge-tried case than in a jury-tried case (an assumption buttressed
by common sense).
Second, it is simplistic to see the jury as merely rendering a factual conclusion as to whether a defendant did or did not do a legally proscribed or required
act. Rather, on any given set of facts there is a range of outcomes that could be
considered just. O.J. Simpson was acquitted. But his jury could have hung. Or he
could have been found guilty of murder, or of voluntary manslaughter. The
jury's verdict necessarily contains many subjective elements. They do not find
thought that incest and arson were the same thing.
Id at 881-82, quoting Mark Twain, Roughing It 342-43 (Penguin, 1985). The downside
to this legal naivet6 is obvious. First, jury verdicts, not greatly unrestrained by the law,
may not show obvious consistency from one case to the next. Second, jury verdicts loosed
from the moorings of the law may be influenced by factors that many might view as
insignificant, unwise, legally impermissible, and even immoral.
Defenders of the criminal jury usually claim that the jurybox transforms ordinary
people into wise citizens who suddenly show astounding legal sophistication. This claim
finds theoretical support in notions of Natural Law and has a long history. It was wellexpressed by John Adams in 1771:
The general Rules of Law and common Regulation of Society, under which ordinary
Transactions arrange themselves, are well enough known to ordinary Jurors. The
great Principles of the Constitution, are intimately known, they are sensibly felt by
every Briton-it is scarcely extravagant to say, they are drawn in and imbibed with
the Nurses Milk and first Air.
Id at 915-16, quoting L. Kinvin Wroth and Hiller Zobel, eds, 1 Legal Papers of John
Adams at 228, 230 (Belknap, 1965).
96. See generally Mary Ann Glendon, A Nation Under Lawyers: How the Crisis in the
Legal Profession is Transforming American Society 153, 152-73?? (Farrar, Straus, 1994)
(defining the "Greenhouse Effect" as "a term (named after the New York Times's Linda
Greenhouse) for the warm reciprocity between activist journalists and judges who meet
with their approval").
97. Ballew v Georgia, 435 US 223 (1977) (holding five person juries unconstitutional).
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merely that O.J. Simpson did or did not kill his wife and her paramour; rather,
they find him "guilty" or "innocent" of some particular charge. In short, they
make a judgment of "culpability."
In addition, even if a jury makes Type 1 error-holding an innocent man
guilty-the judge can check their error by overturning the verdict as against the
manifest weight of the evidence.9" Both Type I and Type Il errors (failing to
convict a guilty person) are tempered by what might be the most important
element of the structure of the criminal jury system, namely, the traditional
unanimity requirement.99 The fact that each and every juror has the power to
hang the jury is difficult to overstress. Not only does the veto power make it
possible for the juror(s) convinced of a defendant's guilt or innocence to check
the majority, the awareness of the veto power makes clear to all participants
that their job is not fundamentally representative, but deliberative."° If jurors
treat the jurybox solely as a majoritarian forum, there is a risk that many
disputes could result in hung-juries.
3. The jurymandered jury is less racialized.
Consider a jury of eleven whites and one black. In this scenario, it seems
likely, especially in a racialized case, that the African-American juror will view
herself as a representative of her race. She may ask herself, "If I don't represent
the interests of African-Americans, who will?" Equally problematic, white jurors
may tend to view her opinion as "the black perspective."

98. Consider the 1991 trial of EI-Sayyid Nosair for the killing of the founder of the
Jewish Defense League, Meir Kahane. William Kunstler, serving as Nosair's attorney,
attempted to get a "third world jury of nonwhites, or anyone who's been pushed down
by white society." When the jury acquitted Nosair, the judge declared the verdict to be
"against the overwhelming weight of the evidence and . . .devoid of common sense and
logic." Alschuler, 44 Duke L J at 735 (cited in note 15).
99. The Court's 1972 holdings in Apodaca v Oregon, 406 US 404 (1972), and
Johnson v Louisiana, 406 US 356 (1972), authorizing less than unanimous verdicts in state
noncapital criminal cases, in theory if not in fact, go a long way towards eviscerating the
criminal trial jury. Fortunately, Louisiana and Oregon remain the only states that allow
felony convictions based on non-unanimous verdicts. See generally Abramson, We, the Jury
at 179-205 (cited in note 19).
But see Ballew, 435 US at 232-36 (holding that five person juries are not constitutional for reasons made clear by "recent empirical data"). Marianne Constable asserts that
this data "could have been used just as well [by the Court] to overturn its earlier
decision-that is, it could have been used just as well to say that six-member juries were
also unconstitutional." Constable, The Law of the Other at 164 n 25 (cited in note 55).
100. As the defendant's brief in Apodaca argued:
While members of racial, religious, or ethnic minorities, women, poor people, young
people or other previously excluded groups may now be represented on juries, a
rule permitting a less than unanimous verdict makes it possible for a verdict to be
rendered without their acquiescence and indeed without the consideration of their
views.
Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper, eds, 71 Landmark Briefs and Arguments of the
Supreme Court of the United States: Constitutional Law 872 (University Publications of
America, 1972).
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Under current jury selection procedures such a jury would not be at all
unusual. Some random selections will produce no African-Americans; some will
produce one; some will produce more. In addition, if peremptory challenges are
used (albeit impermissibly) to strike jurors based on their race, a party interested
in eliminating blacks will have a far easier time doing so than a party interested
in striking whites. In contrast, a jurymandered system will not only eliminate
variation from panel to panel, but will undercut the purpose of strikes based on
race.
The jury that was finally empaneled in the O.J. Simpson case was composed
of eight African-Americans, one white, two Hispanics, and a man who identified
himself as half Native American and half white.'0 ' While some commentators
viewed this jury as a victory for the defense,"' at least one expert has speculated that "[i]f the panel has a black majority, race may not be a polarizing element
in deliberations, as it might if blacks were in the minority."'0 3
Jurymandered petit juries also have the benefit of deracializing the peremptory challenge process. While neither the prosecution nor the defense in a criminal
trial can constitutionally strike a juror based on her race, it is likely that racially
motivated peremptories are not uncommon.' ° In addition, in this present regime, well-meaning attorneys and judges are sometimes placed in the position of
keeping an unqualified juror on a panel simply because she is the only minority
member left in the venire.'" s Failure to strike such a juror not only damages the

101. Matt Krasnowski and Paul Pringle, Prosecutors Seemingly Casual About OJ. Jury,
San Diego Union-Tribune A3 (Nov 5, 1994).
102. See Noble, NY Times at A9 (cited in note 6).
103. Krasnowski & Pringle, San Diego Union-Tribune at A3 (cited in note 101).
104. Comment, Women's Jury Service: Right of Citizenship or Privilege of Difference?,
46 Stan L Rev 1115, 1125 (1994) (arguing that stereotypes based on race
"[u]ndeniably .. . often motivate the use of peremptory challenges"), citing Valerie P.
Hans and Neil Vidmar, Judging the Jury 73 (Plenum, 1986).
105. Consider the case of State v Baugb as described by Professor Alschuler:
A more striking illustration of the dangers of sub rosa affirmative action came in
the case of Timothy L. Baugh, an African-American charged with fourteen rapes in
Hennepin County. After one of the two African-Americans on the panel of prospective jurors revealed that she knew three of the defendant's prospective alibi witnesses, Judge Robert Lynn permitted prosecutors to challenge this juror peremptorily.
The one African-American still on the panel sometimes answered questions in a way
that was difficult to follow. When, for example, this juror was asked why he had
checked both yes and no to the question, "Under our system of justice a defendant
is innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Do you agree with that
principle," he replied in part:
You can't really go on facts that much because that's one of the reasons I
got stabbed because she was being-okay, that facts was I done it, but I
didn't do nothing and come to find out I didn't do nothing. The facts not always right.
Asked once more to explain, the juror said:
Let's see, okay, like I did a couple of crimes, but then, okay, I did some of
them and-I did most of them, I did do some of them and I didn't do some
and half of the times, you know, the facts are there, but it's not there.
Other statements, however, displayed a clarity that was sometimes disconcerting. For
example, when the juror was asked, "What do you think of the criminal justice
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integrity of the trial process, but may have the unfortunate consequence of
stigmatizing the minority juror and her race, since this juror will be the only
"representative" of her race in the jurybox. This dilemma disappears in a regime,
like that proposed by Hennepin County, Minnesota, in which racial representatives are inexaustable.
4. Consensus and justice are not synonymous.
The hung jury is probably more common now than it was at the time of the
nation's founding. This does not indicate, however, that the jury is less "deliberative"; it may well indicate the contrary. The fact that during the early years of
the Republic, juries were comprised almost solely of white male
propertyholders °6 undoubtedly increased the chance for consensus in the
jurybox. In a system of government that ensured the civil rights of only EuroAmerican propertied males," °7 homogeneous juryboxes probably produced
more consensus.
But greater consensus does not mean greater justice. Governor William
Shirley of Massachusetts complained that a jury trial in colonial Massachusetts
amounted to "trying one illicit trader by his fellows, or at least by his wellwishers."' 0 8 In the debate over the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, Senator
Sherman offered the testimony of a Southern judge, who complained that
In nine cases out of ten the [white] men who commit the crimes [against
African-American victims] constitute or sit on the grand jury, either they
themselves or their near relatives or friends, sympathizers, aiders, or
abettors; and if a bill is found it is next to impossible to secure a conviction

system?," he replied, "It sucks." He also described the rape of one of his friends as
"just basically sex."
Nevertheless, Judge Lynn refused to dismiss the prospective juror for cause
and also refused to allow a peremptory challenge by the prosecutor. Perhaps the
judge doubted that Minneapolis prosecutors would have challenged a white juror
who voiced the same views of rape and of the criminal justice system as this
African-American juror. More probably, however, the judge accepted an extra-legal
argument against exclusion advanced by the defense attorney. Although the Constitution prohibited this lawyer from taking race into account in exercising his own
peremptory challenges, he apparently saw no need to preserve the pretense of
colorblindness while arguing about his opponent's challenges: "This was our last
chance. We don't have any more opportunities to have a black person on this jury. . . .I ask this Court to let the juror stand."
Following selection of the challenged juror, a Minneapolis television station
broadcast his mug shot. (The mug shot was conveniently on-hand since, just seven
months earlier, the juror had been arrested for aggravated robbery. He was later
released without the filing of a formal charge). The juror then told the court, "I
cannot go on the jury." Six other jurors saw the mug shot while watching the news
in violation of the Judge's order regarding exposure to media coverage of the trial.
Judge Lynn then dismissed the jury and began jury selection anew.
Alschuler, 44 Duke L J at 726-28 (cited in note 15).
106. See Alschuler and Deiss, 61 U Chi L Rev at 877 (cited in note 94).
107. See Jennifer Nedelsky, Private Property and the Limits of American
Constitutionalism:The Madisonian Framework and Its Legacy (Chicago, 1990).
108. Governor William Shirley, quoted in Stephen Botein, Early American Law and
Society 57 (Knopf, 1983).
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upon a trial at the bar. I have heard of no instance in North Carolina
where a conviction of that sort has taken place.0 9
Similarly, an increased percentage of hung juries or acquittals should not necessarily be interpreted as a failing of the criminal justice system. One cannot
legitimately evaluate a change (say an increase in rates of acquittals) without first
establishing the legitimacy of the baseline-an impossible task in the context of
criminal trial juries.
Consider the fact that in racially diverse cities like Los Angeles and Washington, D.C., the incidence of hung juries is about 10 percent, twice the national
rate.1 ' While this may well indicate that racial composition affects verdict
outcomes, it tells us nothing about which regime is achieving greater justice. To
conclude that it does rests on the impermissible preferencing of one baseline over
another."' It also assumes that the African-American jurors (and not EuroAmerican jurors) in these jurisdictions impermissibly employ race as a factor in
deliberation. In short, it views African-American jurors as "representing" their
race in the jurybox by "voting" to advance "black interests" or the interests of
black parties.
Professor Alschuler also notes, sarcastically:

109. Cong Globe, 42d Cong, 1st Sess 158 (1871) (quoting Judge Russell).
110. Adam Pertman, The Race Angle in the Simpson Case Issue Can Sway Juries, Consultants and Studies Say, Boston Globe National/Foreign 2 (October 16, 1994).
111. Some may argue that increased dissension in the jurybox increases chaos and
confusion in society at large, because outcomes of trials will be less predictable. This fear
may be well-founded in the civil side of the law. Historically, as Morton J. Horwitz has
argued, the unpredictability of civil juries in antebellum America may have led the legal
profession in an implicit bargain with commercial interests to "subjugat[e]" them. Morton
J Horowitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860 140-59 (Harvard, 1977).
Outcome predictability, however, is probably not as important in the criminal system
as it is on the civil side. Business interests need consistent resolution of commercial
disputes in order to regulate and plan future transactions. Holmes' "bad man" may desire
criminal juries that provide legalistically consistent outcomes for much the same reasons.
On the other hand, society may benefit from a criminal jury system that is not highly

predictable because potential criminal defendants will find it harder to calibrate the risk
involved in any given criminal enterprise.
It is important to note that outcome predictability, in the criminal trial, is not the
same as equal justice. Every defendant convicted of murdering his spouse and lover in the
same way and context as OJ. Simpson was alleged to have done should receive a
substantially similar verdict and sentence, but not every defendant that kills a spouse and
the spouse's lover does so in the same way. As Professor Alschuler has noted in the
context of sentencing guidelines:
Equality does not mean sameness; the term more commonly refers to the consistent
application of a comprehensible principle or mix of principles to different cases.
Excessive aggregation-treating unlike cases alike-can violate rather than promote
the principle of equality.
Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less Aggregation,
58 U Chi L Rev 901, 916 (1991).
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The Tyrant of Dystopia beheads his subjects for all crimes from speeding
to treason. He and other law-abiding Dystopians
take pride in their system,
2
insisting they have achieved perfect equality.1
Thus concepts such as equality are elusive if not scrutinized.
B. NEGOTIATING JUSTICE: THE NEGOTIATION MODEL

An alternative view is available which is at once less crass and less naive: the
negotiation model of the jury. This understanding of the jury has much in
common with the familiar model of the multiparty negotiation in which it is
necessary that all interested parties come together around the table to reach a
resolution on an issue or set of issues. Failure to include significantly interested
parties not only casts doubt on the fairness of the negotiation proceedings
(especially if they are held in private), but may also throw the continued success
of the agreement into doubt.
In this model, African-American jurors (for example) "represent" the
interests of "their" race in the jurybox not by seeking to advance some agenda;
rather, they represent their race by ensuring, by their very presence on the jury,
that other groups or individuals do not impermissibly use race in the deliberation
process. The jury is a forum in which individuals drawn from interested groups
negotiate a just verdict in a specific criminal case within a range of possible just
outcomes while ensuring that group identity is neither favored or disadvantaged. n 3
The first Rodney King trial is a useful illustration. Many, perhaps most, of
the Americans who witnessed the beating of Mr. King on television believed that
the officers were guilty of using criminally excessive force."' When an almost
all-white jury in Simi Valley disagreed, riot erupted in Los Angeles, partly
because the result was viewed as unjust. What would have happened if the
verdict had come out the other way? One suspects that riot would have been unlikely, but why? One might be tempted to say it is because the result appears to
be more just, but is this a fair conclusion? It seems to me more likely that we

112. Id at 916.

113. The jury in the trial of Mayor Marion Barry of Washington, D.C., may be an example of such a jury at work. In that case, the jury convicted Barry of one misdemeanor
charge, acquitted him on another, and was unable to reach agreement on twelve other
narcotics charges. Michael York and Tracy Thompson, Barry Guilty on 1 Count, Cleared
on 1; Mistrial Declared on 12 Other Charges, Washington Post Al (August 11, 1990).
While there has been no shortage of critics of the Barry jury, there is reason to think that
the jury engaged in deliberation that sought to counterbalance what blacks could see as
overzealous prosecution tactics. Whether or not the balance struck is a "good" one, it was
a decision that all parties could live with.
114. Mayor Tom Bradley of Los Angeles spoke for many Americans when he said of
the videotape, "We saw what we saw, and what we saw was a crime." Bill Boyarski,
Ashes of a Mayor's Dream, LA Times B2 (May 1, 1992).
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believe this outcome to be just because it compares favorably to a verdict that
would have been delivered by a hypothetical jury composed of both blacks and
whites.
To test this hypothesis, imagine a majority African-American jury that also
acquits the defendants. Would there have been a riot? Probably not. Does this
not suggest that the riot resulted not from the particular verdict but from the
combination of a problematic verdict and a problematic (i.e., nearly all-white)
jury? How many black jurors would it have taken to prevent riot? One, two,
six? It is hard to say, but it is clear, I think, that the verdict (no matter what it
was) becomes more palatable with each African-American on the jury.
What if the jury were all-black? Had an all-black jury acquitted the defendants, the public would probably have had greater confidence, even despite the
widespread perception of guilt created by the repeated playing of the videotaped
beating on television."' In effect, in this scenario the community may have
been willing to suspend disbelief and admit, "Well, I guess we were wrong."
If, on the other hand, an all-black jury had voted to convict the defendants,
there would likely have been widespread concern, even from people who themselves concluded from the videotape that King was beaten illegally. Why? The
answer, I believe, is that in this scenario there is a suspicion that race may have
played an impermissible role in the deliberations. Or more accurately, there is the
awareness that there was an oppprtunity in the jurybox for racialized deliberation combined with an awareness that, irf
any case, there were no whites on the
jury to protect "white" interests. And, of course, the verdict does nothing to
allay these fears.
This conception of the jury as a body that represents particular group
interests as well as the interest of society at large is not new. Juries have always
represented group interests as well as judged facts, and they always will. The
very structure of the institution, as it has developed historically, suggests a
reading that appreciates such "negotiated" outcomes. Moreover, throughout the
history of the criminal jury in England and the United States one can find
analogues to the jurymandered jury.
The jury is an ancient institution, but much of its early nature remains
shrouded in the mist of the past, despite the careful work of historians."' In

115. Analytically, this is similar to the reasoning behind the "admission against interest"
exception to the hearsay rule.
116. See J.S. Cockburn and Thomas A. Green, eds, Twelve Good Men and True: The
Criminal Trial Jury in England, 1200-1800 (Princeton, 1988); Thomas Andrew Green,
Verdict According to Conscience: Perspectives on the English Criminal Trial Jury 12001800 (Chicago, 1985); R.H. Helmholz and Thomas A. Green, Juries, Libel, & Justice: The
Role of Englisb Juries in Seventeenth-and Eighteenth-Century Trials for Libel and Slander
(UCLA, 1984); Constable, The Law of the Other (cited in note 55); Sir Frederick Pollock
and Frederic William Maitland, The History of English Law: Before the Time of Edward
I (Cambridge, 1968); James Bradley Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the
Common Law 47-182 (Augustus M. Kelley, 1969) (reprint of 1898 ed); John H. Langbein,
Sbaping the Eigbteentb-Century Criminal Trial: A View from the Ryder Sources, 50 U Chi
L Rev 1 (1983); John H. Langbein, The Criminal Trial before the Lawyers, 45 U Chi L
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the institution's earliest history it is sometimes difficult to distinguish jurors from
judges and witnesses. It is also difficult to know when these functions became
clearly divided. As Professor Constable has written,
These questions cannot be answered any more clearly now than in 1930,
when one author wrote that "none of the writers shed clear light on the
supposed transition period, when jurors, as such, ceased to be witnesses
and the latter, as such, ceased to be jurors." To whatever origin or whatever period one traces the modern jury, one can always find, in its precursors,
a body of persons, representing the community, speaking the truth about
the 1matters
at hand without apparent explicit distinction between fact and
17
law.

The fact that the role of the proto-juror was not clearly delineated also meant
that the juror's "constituency" could not be precisely identified. Did the protojuror speak the truth on "behalf" of the defendant, the king, the community, or
a subgroup within that community? The answer to this question is that he
probably was expected to "represent" the interests of a number of parties when
he spoke the "truth" ("an amalgamation of what we now call 'fact' and
'law.") 1 The vision of the juror as a scientific fact-finder with sole allegiance
to the state is one that is utterly modern.
In this country jurors have also served as group representatives as well as
fact-finders. Article III of the Constitution provides that "the Trial of all Crimes,
except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury."" 9 While this provision
guaranteed to all federal felony criminal defendants the right to a jury trial, it did
not specify from where the jury was to be drawn. Anti-Federalists considered this
to be a grave failing.1 20 Patrick Henry, for instance, saw the failure to protect
a defendant's right to a jury from the vicinage as an opportunity for the government to carry a defendant from one extremity of the state to another in an effort
to find a jury receptive to the government's case.' As another Anti-Federalist
put it, the federal government "can hang any one they please, by having a jury
1
to suit their purpose."

22

Rev 263 (1978); John H. Langbein, The English Criminal Trial Jury on the Eve of the

French Revolution in Antonio Padoa Schioppa, ed, The Trial Jury in England, France,
Germany: 1700-1900 13 (Dunker & Humboldt, 1987); Thomas A. Green, The English

Criminal Trial Jury and the Law-Finding Traditions on the Eve of the French Revolution,

in Antonio Padoa Schioppa, ed, The Trial Jury in England, France, Germany: 1700-1900
41 (Dunker & Humboldt, 1987); Stephen Landsman, The Rise of the Contentious Spirit:
Adversary Procedure in Eighteenth Century England, 75 Cornell L Rev 497 (1990).
117. Constable, The Law of the Other at 15 (cited in note 55), quoting Robert von
Mochzisker, Trial by Jury 54 (Bisel Co., 1930).
118. Constable, The Law of the Other at 15 (cited in note 55).

119. US Const, Art III, S 2, cl 3.
120. See Francis H. Heller, The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United

States: A Study in Constitutional Development 25 (Kansas, 1951).
121. Abramson, We, the Jury at 22-23 (cited in note 19).
122. Id at 569. Recent memory made many early United States' citizens sensitive to this
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The Sixth Amendment was meant to remedy this perceived problem.'23 It
guarantees that the trial occur in the "State ... wherein the crime shall have
been committed," and that the jury be drawn from the "district wherein the
crime shall have been committed.' 21 4 The vicinage requirement was meant to
protect a defendant's rights, but it would be inappropriately reductive to view
the requirement as exclusively benefitting the criminal defendant. The vicinage
right was both the right of the individual and the political right of the community.'25 As Alexis de Tocqueville described the American jury in 1835, it is "a
political institution ... one form of the sovereignty of the people."12 6
The vicinage requirement recognized the interests the local community as a
whole has in the trial. Other requirements ensured the representation of specific
groups. In the United States jury service has long been linked to the right to vote:
from at least the late nineteenth century, state officials2 7 have used lists of registered voters to identify qualified jurors,'2 ' and qualifications for jury service
often paralleled those for suffrage. For example, both jurors and voters were
required to be freeholders. Generally, however, jury statutes made the pool of
potential jurors shallower than the reservoir of voters by adding requirements of
good character, sobriety, intelligence, and the like.2 9

danger. In the years leading up to the Revolution, the Crown often attempted to get
around colonial juries by trying colonial defendants in the mother country. As Edmund
Burke critically described the practice:
[A defendant is] brought hither in the dungeon of a ship's hold . . . he is vomited
into a dungeon on land, loaded with irons, unfurnished with money, unsupported
by friends, three thousand miles from all means of calling upon or confronting evidence ....
Such a person may be executed according to form, but he can never be
tried according to justice.
Edmund Burke, Letter to the Sheriffs of Bristol, in 2 The Works of the Right Honorable
Edmund Burke 189, 192-3 (Little, Brown, 9th ed 1889).
The Declaration of Independence also condemned this practice, listing as a grievance
("transporting us beyond Seas to be tried for pretended offenses [and for] depriving us in
many cases, of the benefits of Trial by Jury").
123. See Heller, The Sixth Amendment at 35 (cited in note 120).
124. US Const, Amend 6.
125. There is nothing sacrosanct about "geographic" community. As Lani Guinier has
argued, the geographic community is "artificial" and there is therefore no inherent reason
why the notion of "vicinage" cannot be extended to other artificial constructs of "commu-

nity," including, race. See Lani Guinier, The Tyranny of the Majority: Fundamental Fairness in Representative Democracy 129 (Free Press, 1994).
126. Alexis de Tocqueville, 1 Democracy in America 283 (Knopf, 1945).
127. The Founding Fathers allowed the states to determine the requisite qualifications
for jurors in both state and federal courts convening in those states. See The Federal
Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat 73 5 29 (1789) ("jurors shall have the same qualifications
as are requisite for jurors of the State of which they are citizens").
128. See Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., 61 Tex L Rev at 1469-70 n360, 1473 (1983) (cited in
note 39), citing Williams v Mississippi, 170 US 213 (1898). See also, Barbara D.
Underwood, Ending Race Discriminationin Jury Selection: Whose Right is It, Anyway, 92
Column L Rev 725, 746 n98 (1992); Cassell v Texas, 339 US 282, 285 (1950); Neal v
Delaware, 103 US 370, 389-90 (1980).
129. See Alschuler and Deiss, 61 U Chi L Rev at 877-882 (cited in note 94).
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Over the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as voting requirements were liberalized some jury provisions followed suit. For instance, in 1789
the state of Georgia only required jurors to be qualified "electors." 131 When,
in the following year, Georgia adopted universal white male suffrage, the duty of
jury service was extended to all adult white males as a matter of course. Some
states, like Iowa, entered the Union with both universal white male suffrage and
universal white male jury service.'31
More often, state juror qualifications remained tied to property holding even
after such qualifications were eliminated from voting requirements. Connecticut
had a freeholding requirement for both voting and jury service until 1818, when
the state abolished the requirement for suffrage. M The state retained the freehold requirement for jurors until 1836.133 In 1821, New York replaced its
freeholding requirement for suffrage with a taxpaying requirement, and in 1826
adopted universal male suffrage.1 34 Ownership of property, however, remained
a prerequisite to jury service in New York until 1967, when the State abandoned
its $250 property holding requirement. 3' Even so, a federal court had upheld
the New York requirement for jury service in 1949.13, Similarly, Indiana entered the Union in 1816, with a property holding requirement for jury service
(jurors were drawn from a list of "taxable ... discreet householders and free7
holders"), but not for voting.1
Thus, while tax and property requirements for voting all but disappeared
from state constitutions by the Civil War, 138 they persisted as prerequisites to
jury service well into the twentieth century. Eventually, twentieth century courts
deprived the few remaining tax-related requirements of most of their bite by
holding that they could be satisfied by the payment of a sales tax on any
39
purchase-or even by the payment of a federal tax.
In the early years of the Republic the right to vote was viewed in "much the
same way that one would claim a right to vote as a stockholder in a corpora-

130. An Act to Revise and Amend the Judiciary System of this State (Feb 9, 1797), in
Marbury and Crawford, eds, Digest of Laws of the State of Georgia 277-78 (1802). In
1798, Georgia extended suffrage to all white males, presumably ensuring universal white
male eligibility in the jurybox as well. Georgia's liberal approach seems unusual among the
colonial states, though it appears to have been commonly followed by states that entered
the Union in the years between the founding and the Civil War.
131. See Andrew G. Deiss, Jury Service and the Civil Rights Act of 1875 app (Dec,
1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with The University of Chicago Law School
Roundtable).
132. Kirk H. Porter, A History of Suffrage in the United States 110 (Chicago, 1918).
133. An Act in addition to an Act entitled "an Act for the Regulation of Civil Actions", 1836 Conn Pub Acts ch VI (John H. Boswell, 1837).
134. Porter, A History of Suffrage at 110 (cited in note 132).
135. See N Y Jud Law § 596 (West, 1975) (amended 1967).
136. United States v Foster, 83 F Supp 197, 208 (S D NY 1949).
137. See Deiss, Jury Service at app (cited in note 131).
138. Porter, A History of Suffrage at 111 (cited in note 134).
139. See Clark v Ellenbogen, 319 F Supp 623, 627 (W D Pa 1970).
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tion."140 Only those who had "invested" in the community by purchasing land

were recognized as having a sufficient interest in the community to warrant the
right to vote. The same theory applied to juries. Statutes limited jurors to those
who held an interest in the community as evidenced by the freehold. While this
philosophy rapidly lost hold in the suffrage context, 141 it showed remarkable
longevity in the jurybox. In 1880, for instance, The American Law Register
published approvingly a passage by New York lawyer, Hugo Hirsh, declaring:
This property qualification, in my opinion, is not attached merely as a
guard to prevent the juror from being bribed, but for this better reason,
that the juror owning property in the vicinage will have a deeper and better
interest in "the life, liberty, and property" of his fellow citizens, and in the
honest and proper administration of justice, than one who owns nothing.
The one has a permanent
42 interest in the community in which he resides,
and the other has none.'
Even after the property qualification for jury service began to disappear,
other procedures remained that attempted to ensure that only those people with
"a deeper and better interest" in the community served on juries. In many
jurisdictions, officials, often called "selectmen" or "key men," charged with
selecting jurors were given complete discretion to choose jurors from a qualified
pool. As a New Hampshire statute phrased it, the selectmen would make a list
44
of candidates "as they judge best qualified to serve as jurors."'
Over time, egalitarian principles challenged the corporate theory of citizenship that had justified excluding those who owned no property from the
jurybox.'14 The first transformation was primarily theoretical: instead of a jury
of the propertied, the law established a jury of the highly qualified. In 1942, for
instance, a report on the federal jury system from a committee of federal judges
called for increased minority presence on juries; the report, however, specifically
embraced the key man system defending it on the grounds that:
[N]othing in the concept of [cross-sectional juries] opposes the tradition of
federal courts that jurors should be men of recognized intelligence and

140. Porter, A History of Suffrage at 2 (cited in note 134).
141. Id at 110.
142. William S. Brackett, The Freehold Qualification of Jurors, 20 Am L Reg 497, 507
(1880).
143. See Thiel v Southern Pacific Co., 328 US 217, 223-24 (1946) (holding that exclusion of daily wage earners from jury service was unconstitutional).
144. An Act Regulating the Selection and Services of Grand and Petit Jurors, 9 Laws
of New Hampshire 636 (E~ans, 1921) (repealed 1842). See NH Const Art 21.
In fact, it was not unusual for jurisdictions to maintain a "blue-ribbon" jury list
composed of individuals who were adjudged to possess superior intelligence and
decisionmaking skills. In practice, if not always in intent, the "keyman system" and the
"blue ribbon jury" served to exclude minorities and the underprivileged from jury service.
Abramson, We, the Jury at 99-100 (cited in note 19).
145. See Theil, 328 US at 223-24.
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probity."'
While representing a shift in theory, in practice this new standard continued to
serve as a proxy for property holding.
Historically, then, juries were drawn from those who were judged to hold
"better" interests in the community at large. In special situations, the American
legal tradition recognized the interests of particular groups in the jurybox.
Consider the "slave court," developed in British colonies to try cases of slave
147
criminality that were perceived to require more than "plantation justice."
The slave court was used extensively in the South as well as in New York, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Delaware 4 before the Civil War. It was, in effect, a
"special jury" composed of several justices of the peace and several slaveholding
freeholders. In North Carolina in 1741, for instance, the law called for the local
magistrate to summon "two justices and four slaveowning freeholders to meet at
the courthouse for the trial of the slave."' 49 These slaveholders would, it was
expected, look after the interests of the slaveholding aristocracy as well as that
of the slave.
Or consider the Anglo-American practice of empaneling juries de medietate
linguae's to hear cases to which an alien was a party. These juries, composed
half of aliens and half of citizens, were first used in medieval England in cases
In America,
between English citizens and Jewish and foreign merchants.'
these juries were recognized by statute in a number of states," 2 and were occasionally used to try cases involving American Indians' as well as aliens.'
In 1823, Chief Justice John Marshall used a mixed jury in a case in which an

146. Judicial Conference of the United States, Report to the Judicial Conference of the
Committee on Selection of Jurors 15 (1942).
147. Daniel J. Flanigan, Criminal Procedure in Slave Trials in the Antebellum South XL
J of Southern Hist 537, 539 (1974).
148. Alan D. Watson, North Carolina Slave Courts, 1715-1785 LX?? North Carolina
Hist Rev 24, 25 (1983).
149. Id at 25.
150. The term literally means "of the half-tongue." Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed). See
generally Ramirez, The Mixed Jury and the Ancient Custom of Trial By Jury De Medietate Linguae: A History and a Proposal For Change, 74 BU L Rev at 777 (cited in note

21).
151. Ramirez, 74 BU L Rev at 783-84 (cited in note 21).
152. At least Mississippi, Kentucky, Pennsylvania, New York, Virginia, and North Caro-

lina.
153. Ramirez reports that Plymouth Colony records of 1674 discuss a case involving the
murder of an Indian by several other Indians. Twelve of the jurors were Englishmen, but
the court decided that "some of the most indifferentist, gra[v]est and sage Indians" should
be admitted to the jury "to help to consult and advi[sle." Accordingly, the court added
Six Indians to the jury. Ramirez, 74 BU L Rev at 790-91 (cited in note 21).
154. See Respublica v Mesca, 1 Dallas 73 (Pa 1783); People v McLean, 2 Johnson 381
(NY 1807); State v Antonio, 4 Hawk 200 (NC 1825); Richards v Commonwealth, 11
Leigh 690 (Va 1841).
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alien was charged with piracy."55 As late as 1911, the Kentucky Supreme Court
affirmed that the mixed juries were permissible-at the discretion of the trial
judge-by Kentucky statute."
As far as I am aware, such juries were never actually empaneled to try cases
in disputes between African and Euro-Americans, though before the passage of
the Fourteenth Amendment, it was sometimes suggested. During the debate
surrounding the Pennsylvania Constitutional Convention of 1837-38, for
instance, there was heated controversy over whether or not to include a provision granting trial by jury to fugitive slaves. One delegate was skeptical that
Pennsylvania citizens would treat African-American as peers:
Trial by jury for fugitive slaves! for blacks by whites! What a solecism, an
absurdity. From Magna Charta down, trial by jury has been a trial by
peers, by equals; vassals, says Blackstone, by their fellow vassals, lords by
their brother lords. If this trial is to be conferred on blacks by their friends,
let us as least carry out the true spirit of the grant, and give the blacks a
jury of their own colour; give them at any rate a jury de medietate, half of
the kind of the party to be tried. Otherwise, we violate the very principle
of equality consecrated trial by jury as heretofore, and pervert it to the
prejudice of those we pretend to befriend.' 7
The 14th Amendment, by making African-Americans citizens of the United
States, made the direct application of the mixed jury conceptually awkward.
African-Americans were now equal citizens before the law; the remnants of caste
and status were to be thrown aside. Nevertheless, the principle of group representation for which the mixed jury stood-along with the freeholding and
vicinage requirements-remains.
Conclusion
In an attempt to achieve racial harmony and ensure justice, states are
increasingly attempting to ensure racial diversity in the jurybox. While no
program, to date, has explicitly called for racial quotas on trial juries, such an
approach should be considered. This Comment has argued that the states should
be able to demonstrate compelling interests in ensuring racially integrated juries.
This Comment also contends that the use of racial quotas on the trial jury is the
only way of protecting state interests in every case. Moreover, this Comment
argues that racial quotas in trial juries do not harmfully discriminate against any
race or group. Finally, this Comment demonstrates that the history of the jury
system is a history of an institution wherein members of diverse groups negotiate

155. United States v Cartacbo, 25 F Cas 312 (CCD Va 1823).
156. Wendling v Commonwealth, 143 Ky 587 (1911). A French citizen had been
accused of murder and demanded a mixed jury but, since the statute allowed for mixed

juries at the discretion of the judge, the request was denied.
157. XI Proceedings and Debates of the Convention of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 297 (Packer, Barret 1938). The amendment failed 76-39.
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outcomes to particular cases while ensuring that their group's interests are not
compromised.
In Federalist No 2 John Jay wrote:
Providence has been pleased to give this one connected country to one
united people-a people descended from the same ancestors, speaking the
same language, professing the same religion, attached to the same principles
of government, very similar in their manners and customs."' 8
Jay's description, as politically incorrect as it obviously seems today, unquestionably represented the civic reality of the early nation. White hnen who did not
own property, women, African-Americans, Indians, Asians, and Hispanics, were
all denied full citizenship.' How our democratic institutions can survive in a
today's truly pluralist culture is one of the most important questions facing us in
the twenty-first century. We will not find the answer by hamstringing state
governments in their efforts to resolve these tensions. As the Supreme Court
declared in 1947,
[W]e ... will not use [the Fourteenth] Amendment to standardize
administration of justice and stagnate local variations in practice. The jury
system is one which has undergone great modifications in its long history, . . . and it is still undergoing revision and adaptation to adjust it to the
tensions of time and locality.... The states have had different and constantly changing tests of eligibility for service. Evolution of the jury continues even now, and many experiments are under way that were strange to
the common law ... Well has it been said of our power to limit state
action that "To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a
grave responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with
serious consequences to the Nation.""'
Perhaps now is the time for just such an experimentation.

158. Federalist 2 (Jay) in (editor??), The Federalist Papers, pincite & (date).
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160. Fay v New York, 332 US 261, 295-96 (1947), quoting New State Ice Co v
Liebmann, 285 US 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis dissenting).

